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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post 
conviction relief which follows a remand to the district court from a prior appeal of 
its summary dismissal. The issue is very narrow and is whether the court erred 
when it held that Mr. Hyer, who was incarcerated out of state, failed in his burden 
of showing that he did not have access to Idaho legal materials and thus the 
statute of limitations would not be equitably tolled. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The background of this matter is explained by the Court of Appeals in its 
unpublished opinion in the prior appeal, Hyer v. State, docket no. 36802 (Ct.App. 
10/29/2010) (unpublished): 
In the underlying criminal case, Hyer pied guilty to one count of 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen pursuant to a plea 
agreement. l.C. § 18-1508. Hyer entered the agreement in 
exchange for the state dismissing three counts of possession of 
sexually exploitative material. The district court imposed a unified 
twenty-year sentence, with six years determinate. Hyer challenged 
the sentence through an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion arguing 
that he "received two addenda to his presentence investigation 
report (PSI), which he was unaware of at the time his sentence was 
imposed." The district court granted a hearing on the Rule 35 
motion and subsequently entered a written order affirming the 
original sentence. Hyer appealed and this Court vacated his 
judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court 
for resentencing at a proceeding in which Hyer was in attendance. 
Following remand, the district court re-entered judgment. 
More than four years after the re-entered judgment of conviction, 
Hyer filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging: (1) 
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) violation of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) denial of 
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"fundamental fairness embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause." In addition, Hyer filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel. The district court granted Hyer's request 
for counsel, and also issued a notice of intent to dismiss all claims 
except for one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
district court subsequently entered an order summarily dismissing 
Hyer's petition after receiving no response from Hyer. Hyer then 
filed a motion for reconsideration through counsel pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Hyer's post-conviction counsel 
submitted an affidavit in support of the motion in which he stated 
that he and Hyer were in disagreement over which claims should 
be pursued. Hyer's counsel acknowledged that he had not complied 
with the district court's notice, but asked the court to find good 
cause or excusable neglect for his noncompliance. The district 
court determined that the disagreement between Hyer and his 
counsel did not justify the failure to file a timely response and 
denied the motion to reconsider. Hyer appeals from both the 
summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as well 
as the denial of the motion for reconsideration. 
Id., p. 1-2. 
The Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding that the district court erred 
by not providing proper notice before it dismissed his claim that his trial counsel 
failed to file an appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., p. 7. 
Back in the district court, the state moved for summary dismissal and filed 
a memorandum in support, raising the affirmative defense of the statute of 
limitations and asserting that the petition was untimely filed. (R. p. 9, 11-15.) 
The court ultimately dismissed the petition on timeliness grounds. (R. p. 
66-68.) 
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 70.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the post conviction 
relief petition as untimely. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION AS UNTIMELY 
A. Standard of Review 
"Our review of the district court's construction and application of the time 
limitations aspects of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a matter of 
free review." Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188 (Ct.App. 2009). 
B. The Timeliness Arguments and the Court's Rulings 
First of all, it was undisputed below that the statute of limitations ran on 
April 6, 2006, but Mr. Hyer's petition for post conviction relief was not filed until 
April 20, 2009. 
In the affidavit of facts in support of post conviction petition, Mr. Hyer 
explained that in 2005 he was unexpectedly transferred out of Idaho to the 
correctional facility in Appleton, Minnesota, until he was again transferred to the 
correctional facility in Littlefield, Texas. (R. 36802, p, 12.1) His affidavit 
continued: 
While housed in the out of state correctional institutions, petitioner 
had no meaningful access to courts, adequate law library or 
materials for developing legal claims, nor available assistance from 
any person trained in the law. Petitioner further asserts his 
ignorance to [sic] the law and its recourse for remedies. 
1 This citation is to the record in the original appeal, of which the Supreme 
Court took judicial notice pursuant to an order issued March 26, 2012. (R. p. 2.) 
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Petitioner was returned to the Idaho prison from Texas in January 
of 2009 where he had a reasonable access to the Idaho court and 
acceptable law library to develop his claims. 
Affidavit of Facts (internal paragraph numbering omitted). (R. 36802, p. 12.) 
Attached thereto was an (IDOC) offender profile which indicated that he 
went to Minnesota on October 24, 2005, and then Texas on May 30, 2006, and 
was returned to Idaho on January 4, 2009. (R. 36802, p. 22.) 
As explained by the court in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, Mr. Hyer relied on the above affidavit and did not put on any 
more evidence regarding the matter at the hearing following the remand on the 
timeliness question. (R. p. 67.) 
At the hearing, the court asked appointed counsel whether Mr. Hyer had 
the ability to file a petition during the first eight months of his incarceration which 
occurred in Idaho. (Tr. p. 4.) Appointed counsel answered that she believed it 
was a possibility, but that would have meant that for just this particular defendant, 
the statute of limitations was only eight months, as opposed to one year for 
everyone else. (Tr. p. 4.) 
The court then asked whether there was computer access in the Texas 
facility. (Tr. p. 4-5.) Counsel answered "no." (Tr. p. 5.) 
The state then explained that while Mr. Hyer was transported to Minnesota 
during the year and 42-day period following the re-entry of the judgment, he was 
there the entire time until after the statute of limitations ran, so what was 
available in Texas was irrelevant to the question currently before the court. (Tr. p. 
5-6.) The state agreed that he was in the Appleton, Minnesota, Prairie 
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Correctional facility from October 2005 until the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. (Tr. p. 6.) 
The state basically argued that the eight months prior to his being 
transferred was enough time, and his intelligence level and background did not 
indicate there was some reason he couldn't have filed a petition in the eight 
months. (Tr. p. 7-9.) 
The court's ruling was as follows in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief: 
.... Mr. Hyer did not file his petition until approximately four years 
after that date. Furthermore, Mr. Hyer has not met his burden of 
coming forward to show that he did not have access to Idaho legal 
materials. While his affidavit filed in conjunction with his petition for 
post-conviction relief asserts that he did not have access to 
adequate materials to develop his claim, he did not present any 
evidence whatsoever as to what legal materials, if any, he did have 
access to. The Court finds Mr. Hyer's bald assertion inadequate to 
meet his burden of showing a lack of access to Idaho legal 
materials. Thus, this Court cannot find that there are grounds to 
equitably toll the statute of limitations in this case. Consequently, 
the Court finds that Mr. Hyer's petition was not timely filed and that 
it must be dismissed. 
Order at p. 2-3 (emphasis added). (R. p. 67-68.) 
C. The Court Erred in Summarilv Denying the Petition as Untimely 
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it held that Mr. Hyer's 
sworn statement in his affidavit that he did not have adequate legal resources 
while incarcerated out of state was not sufficient to met his burden of showing he 
had inadequate legal materials. Contrary to the court's complaint, it was not a 
bald assertion. 
First of all, the assertion was more complex than the court acknowledges. 
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He did not just say that the legal resources at the Minnesota facility were not 
adequate for developing legal claims as suggested by the court. (R. p. 67.) He 
was more specific, stating that there were no adequate materials or adequate law 
library for developing legal claims, nor available assistance from any person 
trained in the law. 
Second, there was no controverting evidence from the state. The state 
conceded that Mr. Hyer was not housed in Idaho during the relevant time. More 
to the point, it did not controvert in any way that the legal resources in Minnesota 
were inadequate or suggest that they were adequate. Rather, its argument was 
that Mr. Hyer should have been able to prepare his petition in Idaho before he 
was transferred.2 
Third, the filing of the petition shortly after his return to Idaho where he 
says he had adequate resources corroborates that the out of state resources 
were not adequate, or else he would have earlier filed it.3 
2 As an aside since the court did not base its ruling on this, to hold that Mr. 
Hyer had adequate time to file the petition before he was transferred would 
basically mean that he should have somehow anticipated that the statutory 
limitations period would be cut down not by a few days, but almost in half, and so 
should have filed his petition long before the statute said it was due. But an after 
the fact requirement that an action be filed well before the statute of limitations 
runs is contrary to the very purpose of a statute of limitations which establishes 
the last point in which an action can be timely filed with no obligation to file it 
sooner. In short, it is just not how much time for which a petitioner had access to 
Idaho law which matters, it also matters when that time is in relation to the 
deadline. 
3 This is why the state was incorrect that the inadequacy of the Texas 
resources was irrelevant. Also, it goes to how long the statute of limitations 
should be tolled. 
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Finally, the court relies heavily on Mr. Hyer's use of the word "adequate." 
However, a failure to explain what legal resources were available does not 
somehow make them adequate or controvert his statement that they were not 
adequate. Had he simply said there were no materials, this presumably would 
have satisfied the court. But the use of the word "adequate" does not necessarily 
mean there were some materials available, a complete absence of something 
can also be described as not adequate. 
While of course the Petitioner has to meet his burden, he would have no 
reason to know that whether he could proceed with his petition or not would 
essentially be determined by his use of the word "adequate." Therefore, if the 
court was going to so heavily rely on that word choice, it should have just asked 
what he meant during the hearing where it asked other questions, rather than not 
asking and dismissing the petition because the information it desired was not 
volunteered. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post 
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this ?7ay of August, 2012. /2 / / 
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